A dialogue without trust is not a peace process
Sudanese opposition groups have rejected a dialogue backed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and have instead proposed an alternative peace process. This is not simply another disagreement over the format of negotiations. It exposes the central political problem behind Sudan’s continuing war: a process cannot produce legitimate peace if major civilian and political constituencies believe it is designed by one armed party to preserve its power.
For European readers, this development should change the way Sudan is discussed. The question is not whether another conference can be convened, nor whether a declaration can contain the word “dialogue”. The decisive questions are who sets the agenda, who is represented, whether armed actors can be held accountable, and whether civilians affected by violence have any meaningful influence over a post-war settlement.
A Burhan-backed initiative may be presented as a route to stability. Yet opposition rejection signals that the initiative lacks a minimum level of political consent. Without that consent, it risks becoming a mechanism for international recognition of an existing military hierarchy rather than a negotiated transition away from war.
Why the rejection matters now
Sudan’s conflict is also a crisis of political representation
Since fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began in April 2023, Sudan has suffered mass displacement, widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and an acute humanitarian emergency. Military advances and setbacks have repeatedly shaped diplomatic calculations. But they cannot answer the constitutional and political questions that existed before the war: who governs, under what civilian authority, and how can Sudan’s security institutions be restructured so that they no longer dominate political life?
The opposition’s push for an alternative process reflects a belief that these questions cannot be settled by a dialogue sponsored or controlled by the SAF leadership. Civilian networks, political parties, resistance committees, professional groups, women’s organisations, displaced communities and regional representatives have different priorities from military commanders. They are likely to demand civilian rule, protections for local communities, accountability for atrocities, humanitarian access and a credible timetable for security-sector reform.
Those demands are difficult to accommodate in a process built primarily around the interests of armed elites. That is precisely why representation is not a procedural detail. It determines the substance of any eventual agreement.
A narrow deal could freeze conflict rather than end it
History offers a clear warning. Elite bargains can reduce violence temporarily while leaving the structures that generate violence intact. If a future Sudan arrangement protects command structures, excludes communities in Darfur, Kordofan and other heavily affected areas, or postpones accountability indefinitely, it may create a pause in fighting without creating durable peace.
That outcome would be dangerous for Sudanese civilians and counterproductive for Europe. A fragile deal can rapidly collapse, deepen displacement and generate further regional instability across Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt and the Red Sea corridor. It can also leave humanitarian agencies operating in an environment where access is negotiated through armed gatekeepers rather than guaranteed by civilian institutions and international humanitarian law.
What a credible alternative peace process should include
Opposition groups are right to insist that process design matters. However, rejecting a Burhan-backed dialogue will only gain practical force if an alternative is specific, inclusive and capable of mobilising regional and international support.
Civilian leadership, not token consultation
Civilian representatives must have formal decision-making roles, not merely seats in side meetings. This includes groups with local legitimacy: neighbourhood resistance committees, trade unions, women-led organisations, refugee and displacement representatives, human-rights defenders and political forces that reject rule by either warring party.
Inclusion must also go beyond Khartoum-based elites. Communities that have faced repeated violence in Darfur and other peripheral regions cannot be invited after the main bargain is drafted. Their participation should shape ceasefire monitoring, local security arrangements, land and property claims, reparations and transitional justice from the outset.
A comprehensive political settlement may take time. Food, medicine, safe passage and protection for aid workers cannot wait for it. Mediators should establish verifiable humanitarian commitments as an early and separate track: cross-line aid delivery, unhindered cross-border access where required, protection of health facilities, and public reporting on obstruction.
This is an area where European governments can act more usefully than through rhetorical calls for peace. Funding should prioritise independent Sudanese relief networks and humanitarian organisations able to reach civilians, while diplomatic pressure should be directed at all parties that block or divert assistance. Aid must not become leverage for military factions seeking legitimacy.
Ceasefire monitoring with consequences
A ceasefire without monitoring is often an announcement rather than a safeguard. Any new framework needs independently verified reporting, local communication channels for civilians and clear consequences for violations. African institutions should be central, with support from the African Union and relevant regional bodies, rather than allowing outside powers to compete for influence through parallel initiatives.
European states can provide technical support, sanctions enforcement and humanitarian finance, but should avoid imposing a settlement detached from Sudanese political realities. The objective should be to reinforce an African- and Sudanese-led process, not replace it.
The European policy test: consistency over convenience
For the European Union and individual European governments, Sudan presents a difficult but necessary test of values-based foreign policy. Europe has legitimate interests in preventing regional destabilisation, supporting Red Sea security and avoiding further forced displacement. But treating migration control as the principal objective would be both ethically wrong and strategically shortsighted.
When people flee Sudan, they do so because homes, markets, hospitals and local governance have been destroyed. Policies that focus mainly on containment may shift pressure onto neighbouring states while doing little to reduce the drivers of displacement. The more effective approach is sustained humanitarian support, protection pathways for those at risk, engagement with Sudanese civil society and pressure against actors financing or enabling abuses.
Europe should also be cautious about rewarding military actors merely because they appear able to deliver short-term order. The record of Sudan’s interrupted democratic transition shows why that calculation fails. After the 2019 uprising removed Omar al-Bashir, civilian aspirations were repeatedly subordinated to military power-sharing. The October 2021 coup further undermined the transition, and the 2023 war demonstrated the consequences of a political order in which competing armed institutions retained autonomous power.
A durable settlement therefore requires more than a ceasefire between the SAF and RSF. It requires a pathway to a unified, accountable security sector under civilian authority. That is a long-term task, but it must be embedded in the first political framework rather than deferred until military leaders have consolidated their positions.
What readers and organisations can do
Citizens cannot negotiate Sudan’s peace agreement, but they can demand better priorities from their governments and institutions. Ask whether national and EU policy supports independent humanitarian access, civilian representation and accountability, or whether it privileges security partnerships with armed leaders. Follow Sudanese journalists, researchers and civil-society organisations rather than relying solely on official diplomatic statements. Their reporting often reveals who is excluded from negotiations and where civilians are being harmed.
For NGOs, universities, local authorities and professional associations, practical solidarity can include partnerships with credible Sudanese-led aid groups, scholarship and fellowship support for displaced students and academics, and public advocacy for humanitarian visas and family reunification. These measures do not substitute for political action, but they reduce the isolation that war imposes on Sudanese communities.
The opposition’s rejection should not be interpreted as a rejection of peace. It is a warning that peace without legitimacy is likely to reproduce the crisis. European policymakers should listen carefully: a process that excludes Sudanese civilians may be easier to announce, but it will be far harder to sustain.
FAQ
Why did Sudanese opposition groups reject the Burhan-backed dialogue?
The reported rejection indicates that opposition groups do not regard a dialogue backed by SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as sufficiently independent or inclusive. Their concern is that a process shaped by one warring party could legitimise military control rather than create a civilian-led political transition.
Does this mean peace talks in Sudan have failed?
Not necessarily. It means the legitimacy and design of talks are contested. A viable process can still emerge if it includes broad civilian representation, urgent humanitarian measures, credible ceasefire monitoring and an agreed route toward civilian authority and security-sector reform.
What should the EU prioritise in response?
The EU should prioritise humanitarian access, funding for Sudanese-led relief work, protection for refugees and people at risk, support for African-led mediation, and targeted pressure on actors responsible for abuses or obstruction. It should not treat migration containment or a quick elite deal as substitutes for a durable settlement.
Can an agreement between the SAF and RSF end Sudan’s crisis?
It may reduce fighting, but it cannot by itself resolve the crisis. A sustainable agreement must address civilian governance, accountability, regional inequalities, displacement, local security and the integration of armed forces under democratic civilian oversight.
Source: Middle East Monitor — Mon, 24 Aug 2026 11:39:00 GMT
